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Ivers: When Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse Reporting Statute?

WHEN MUST A PRIEST REPORT UNDER A
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING STATUTE?
RESOLUTION TO THE PRIESTS'
CONFLICTING DUTIES
-

I.

INTRODUCTION

The priest-penitent privilege is a testimonial privilege that grants protection from compelled disclosure to certain confidential communications
between a priest and a penitent.' The granting of a testimonial privilege is
based upon a policy decision favoring protection of individual privacy interests, government secrets, and specific relationships over the court's right to
"everyman's testimony." 2 Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and
the Virgin Islands have all codified their policy8 in statutes granting a privi1. Privilege rules against compelled testimony must be distinguished from other exclusionary rules of evidence. Generally, rules of exclusion, such as the hearsay and opinion rules,
are designed to keep out unreliable, misleading or prejudicial evidence and thereby facilitate
the ascertainment of facts. Privileges keep out evidence that would otherwise be competent in
order to protect and promote other interests and relationships valued by society. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 72-77 (3d ed. 1984). See also, McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938).
2. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72. The creation of a testimonial privilege
represents a judicial or legislative decision that the value of protecting certain relationships
outweighs the potential benefit to the judiciary in compelled testimony. Generally, testimonial
privileges are granted to relationships that require confidentiality and privacy to effectively
operate. See also In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D. Nev. 1983) (case acknowledges
existence of child-parent testimonial privilege).
3.

ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986); ALASKA R. EVID. 506; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-

2233 (1978 & Supp. 1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. 505 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1974 & Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b)
(West Supp. 1986); DEL. R. EVID. 505; D.C. CODE ANN. § 309 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.505 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982 & Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
626-506 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1979 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para.
8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-14-5 (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §
622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.210 (Baldwin 1981 & Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4015 (Supp. 1986); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111
(1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156
(1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1947 & Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22
(Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §
26-1-804 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie
1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.35 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West
Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (1986); N.M.R. EVID. 11-506; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L.
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lege of confidentiality to communications between priest and penitent4 when
specific prerequisites are met. The communication must be made to a clergyman who is acting in his professional capacity, in confidence, and for
spiritual purposes.'
The confidentiality granted to the priest-penitent relationship went virtually unchallenged until the recent expansions of child abuse reporting
statutes." Every state has enacted a child abuse reporting statute that provides for the identification and investigation of suspected child abuse and
the possible intervention where child abuse is proven. 7 The sections of the
& R. § 4505 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (Baldwin 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEX. R. EVID. 505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977 & Supp.
1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 857 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1963 & Supp. 1987); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-10(a) (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); WYo. STAT. § 1-12-101
(1977). [hereinafter PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES].
4. "Penitent" means any person who communicates with a clergyman for purposes of
making a confession of wrongdoing and for spiritual guidance. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE. §
1031 (West 1966) defining a penitent as: "a person who has made a penitential communication to a clergyman."
5. See Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 108-14 (1983). See also Smith, The Pastor on the Witness Stand:
Toward a Religious Privilege in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1 (1984). A majority of states
grant the privilege if these prerequisites are met. However, some states also require confidentiality of communications be part of the "discipline enjoined" of the religion. See infra notes 8694 and accompanying text.
6. See Silas, Embattled Clergy - Is Confession Always Private? 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (Feb.
1986). See also Ostling, Confidence and the Clergy, TIME, Oct. 1, 1984, at 66.
7. ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47:17:010-:070 (1984 &
Supp. 1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (1978 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
42-807 to -818 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11174.5 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-101 to -117 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-38a to
-38f (1975 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, 99 901-909 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. H9
2101-2162 (1981 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. 99 415.101-.608 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-5 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 350-1 to -7 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601 to
-1630 (1979 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2051-2062 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-11 -1to -21 (West 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.67-.77
(West 1985 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1521 to -1529 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 620.010-.090 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4011-4017 (Supp. 1986); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§§ 5-901 to -912 (1984 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A-51G (West
Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.621-.636 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 210.110-.165 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-201 to -208
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-701 to -727 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432B.010-.400
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169C:29-:32 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-
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child abuse reporting statutes that require reporting and testifying in cases
of suspected child abuse present a direct challenge to the confidentiality
granted in the priest-penitent privilege statutes.' Originally, the reporting
and testifying sections of the child abuse reporting statutes required only
physicians to report.' Many legislatures have recently expanded the reporting sections of these statutes to require other professionals who observe children and who suspect child abuse to report.' 0 If the priest is among the
group of those required or permitted to report and testify in cases of suspected child abuse, and if his suspicions of child abuse arise from a confidential communication, then he is faced with a legal and ethical dilemma of
whether to report or to keep his confidence."'
The unclear effect of the overlap between the privilege statutes and the
reporting statutes causes a legal dilemma for the priest.' 2 An example of
this dilemma occurred recently in Florida where a pastor, Reverend Mellish, was jailed for contempt of court after refusing to testify in a case in8.10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-15 to -16 (1986); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW §§ 411-438 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-542 to 552, 8-53.1 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01 to -14 (1982 & Supp. 1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Baldwin 1978 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-848
(West 1983 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 418.740-.755 (1985); 11 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-1 to -16 (1984 & Supp.
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-480 to -569 (Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 26-10-10 to -18 (1984 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-401 to -413, 37-1-605 to
-616 (Supp. 1986); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-.08 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-3b-I to -16 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 681-689 (Supp. 1985);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.1-.17 (1980 & Supp. 1986); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 2532 (Supp.
1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 44.010-.900 (1986 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 496A-1 to -10 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§
14-3-201 to -215 (1986). [hereinafter REPORTING STATUTES].
8. A report or testimony from a priest in a case of child abuse would violate the privilege if the priest's knowledge of the child abuse was derived from a confidential communication. This conflict is similar to the dilemma faced by psychotherapists. See Comment, Duties
in Conflict: Must PsychotherapistsReport Child Abuse Inflicted by Clients and Confided in
Therapy? 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 (1985).
9. See Fraser, A Glance At The Past, A Gaze At The Present, A Glimpse At The
Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.[]KENT L. REV. 641, 650 (1977-1978). The initial child abuse reporting statutes required only
physicians to report. Legislatures assumed that physicians were the only professionals competent to recognize and diagnose cases of child abuse and neglect.
10. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 651. See also Note, Reporting Child Abuse: When
Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAC. L.J. 189, 190 (1983). The expansion of the group of professionals to include others was undertaken in an effort to identify child abuse at the earliest
stages possible, presumably prior to the need for medical treatment by a physician.
11. See generally Yellin, supra note 5, at 149. Before the states expanded the reporting
statutes, the privilege of confidentiality was granted to the priest-penitent relationship as long
as the prerequisites previously mentioned were met.
12. See Comment, supra note 8, at 645. Like the psychotherapist, the priest is placed in
a position of encountering conflicting duties.
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volving child abuse.' 3 After receiving the defendant's confession of child
abuse, the pastor encouraged the defendant to turn himself in to the proper
authorities."' Thereafter, the pastor accompanied the defendant to the police station but did not report the child abuse or make a statement.1 5 At the
trial, the pastor was called to testify but refused, claiming a privilege of
confidentiality.' 6 The judge refused to honor the long-standing privilege and
cited the pastor for contempt.'
The priest is left with a dilemma and no longer knows what to do when
the confidence made by the penitent deals with child abuse. Under the
priest-penitent privilege statutes, confidentiality is unconditionally granted
to the priest-penitent relationship.18 However, this confidentiality conflicts
with the child abuse reporting statutes, which require reporting and testifying and which apparently abrogate privileges in cases of suspected child
abuse.' The reporting statutes are not clear as to whether the priest-penitent privilege is abrogated. The reporting statutes and the cases to date do
not clearly explain the effect of the overlap and, as a result, the priest is
unsure as to whether he may uphold the confidence of the confession made
to him.
Out of necessity, courts will decide the problem these conflicting statutes present. For several reasons, courts should attempt to resolve the conflict in a way that preserves the confidentiality between a priest and penitent. First, revocation of the confidentiality granted under priest-penitent
privilege statutes would violate free exercise of religion guaranteed under
the constitution. Second, as a practical matter, the priest is unlikely to be
the only source of the requested information. Thus, a report or testimony
would not be needed from the priest and would unnecessarily burden the
relationship with the penitent. Finally, priests who are bound by their
church to keep communications confidential will refuse to report and testify, even though compelled by law and courts. A court may be forced to
incarcerate a priest who refuses to testify. However, if the court resolves the
13. See Florida v. Mellish, 84-9852CF810, discussed in Silas, supra note 6, at 36. The
case was appealed to the 4th District Court of Appeals in West Palm Beach. Mellish v. State
of Florida, 84-1930, discussed in Silas, supra note 6, at 36. While on appeal, the 1985 session
of the Florida legislature amended the Child Abuse Statute to exempt clergymen. Id. See also
Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
14. See Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
15. See Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
16. See Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
17. See Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
18. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 110. Texas, however, does not apply the privilege when,
in the interests of justice, the testimony is required.
19. See Comment, supra note 8, at 649. If the priest is required to report all suspicions
of child abuse, including those suspicions obtained during a confidential communication with a
penitent, then the priest faces a conflict of duties. By reporting, the priest breaches his duty of
confidence, and by not reporting he breaches a potential duty to report.
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conflicting statutes by interpreting them to not abrogate and mandate disclosure, these constitutional problems and unconstitutional results could be
avoided.
This note will attempt to present courts with a means to avoid the
potential problems, and to resolve the dilemma presented by the conflict
between the priest-penitent privilege statutes and the child abuse reporting
statutes. First, in order to resolve this dilemma, testimonial privileges must
be examined. The history, scope, and purpose of both the priest-penitent
privilege and the child abuse reporting statutes will be discussed to determine the legislature's intent. Next, the various overlaps and conflicts between these statutes will be defined to clarify the problem for each state.
Finally, this note will resolve the dilemma and apparent conflicts under
principles of statutory construction, and will propose a resolution based
upon a common-law analysis of the effect of the reporting statutes' requirements on other testimonial privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege
and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

II.
A.

PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE

Evidentiary Privilege in General

As a general rule of evidence law, all federal and state courts have the
right to obtain testimonial evidence from all relevant sources.20 Thus, when
a witness is called to the stand he must testify to all matters that are within
his knowledge and competence.2 1 This rule is based upon society's interest
in a properly and effectively functioning judicial system.2" The general proposition is that the truth can best be obtained by examining the testimony
of all competent witnesses. However, legislatures and courts have carved
out certain exceptions to this rule of obligatory testimony.2"
One exception to the general rule of obligatory testimony involves the
area of testimonial privileges.2 4 Under this exception, a person is not re20.

In Lord Hardwicke's words, "the public has a right to every man's evidence." 8 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughtan rev. ed. 1961).

21. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 10-15. The common law required that the
witnesses testify to facts that could be perceived by the senses, and that the witnesses had
actually observed. This rule is commonly referred to as the rule of first-hand knowledge. Thus,
a witness cannot testify to a matter unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.
22. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 10. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20,
at § 2192.
23. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note I, at § 10. Examples of exceptions to the general
rule of obligatory testimony include the opinion rule, the hearsay rule, and the testimonial
privilege rules.
24. See Note, Evidence Law-The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege In Federal Courts,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1983-1984). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at
§ 72. The rules of testimonial privilege are unique rules of evidence as they do not foster the
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quired or allowed to testify because of specified relationships, 25 circumstances, 26 or rights.2 7 Unlike most exclusionary rules, " a testimonial privi-

lege allows a witness to withhold information that would otherwise be
relevant and helpful to the court. 20 The granting of the testimonial privilege, like the general rule of obligatory testimony, is based upon a careful
balancing of individual and societal interests in protecting specific relationships, circumstances, rights, and the judicial interest in obtaining all relevant evidence.2 0 When a testimonial privilege is granted, the individual and
societal interests in protecting certain rights and relationships is deemed
paramount to the judicial interests in obtaining all relevant evidence in the
pursuit of truth.3 1
One area protected by testimonial privileges involves private and professional relationships. 32 In this area, the privilege attempts to protect the
atmosphere of confidentiality that is necessary for the proper and effective
functioning of the relationship.3 3 Examples of protected relationships include the attorney-client, the physician-patient, the psychotherapist-patient,
and the husband-wife relationship. 4 Although the privileges in this area
deal with the functioning of the relationship, they also involve the extensive
judicial fact-finding system. The justifications for such rules are not based on the need to
exclude unreliable or misleading evidence; rather, the justifications are based on the benefit
society receives as a result of protecting communications within specific relationships.
25. Relationships that are granted confidentiality include the attorney-client relationship, the husband-wife relationship, the physician-patient relationship, and the priest-penitent
relationship. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 72-105 (the rationale for these
privileges is that public policy requires the encouragement of the communications without
which these relationships could not effectively function).
26. Circumstances that are granted confidentiality include government-held secrets or
classified military material. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note I, at §§ 106-13 (generally, the rationale forwarded for these privileges is that disclosure would be injurious to the
public interest).
27. Rights that involve confidentiality or nondisclosure of testimony include the right
against self-incrimination and the right against illegally obtained evidence. See generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note i, at §§ 114-83. Under these privileges, the innocent individual is
protected from the danger of creating an unreasonable prejudice and the guilty individual is
assured treatment in a manner consistent with basic respect and dignity. Also, the accused is
protected against abuse of the judicial process.
28. Generally, exclusionary rules are designed to exclude evidence that would be unreliable, misleading, or prejudicial. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72.
29. Note, supra note 24, at 793.
30. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72. See also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 20, at
2285 (by protecting these interests, a privilege encourages open communication within specified relationships and at the same time preserves the right of privacy).
31. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72.
32. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D. Nev. 1983) (holding child could
claim parent-child privilege for testifying adversely against father).
33. Id. See also Note, supra note 24, at 794; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72.
34. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 72-105.
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and correlative privacy interests mentioned in other protected privilege areas.35 Thus, the areas and interests that testimonial privileges protect, to
some extent, overlap and are interrelated."
The priest-penitent privilege is similar to other testimonial privileges
that involve an evidentiary exception to obligatory testimony and are based
upon several interrelated interests.3 7 Initially, the priest-penitent privilege
could be classified within the realm of testimonial privileges designed to
protect specific professional relationships. The priest-penitent privilege protects the priest-penitent relationship.)8 In addition, this privilege of confidentiality is designed to protect the individual's interest in privacy. 9 Further, the priest-penitent privilege involves the priest's and penitent's
interests in free exercise of religion.40 Although the priest-penitent privilege
involves several different interests, an examination of the history, justifications, and present applications of the privilege will clarify its scope and
purpose.
B.

History

The history of the priest-penitent privilege reveals that the evidentiary
problem of whether a testimonial privilege exists for confidential communications between a priest and penitent is not new."1 The first known case was
reported in 1606 under King James 1.42 In the United States the privilege
was recognized as early as 1813.48 However, even though the existence of a

priest-penitent privilege was recognized early in our country's history, the
question of the privilege's existence has not been extensively litigated.""
The first court in the United States to recognize the existence of a
35. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72.
36. Note, supra note 24, at 794.
37. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 108-14 (the priest-penitent privilege involves interests in
the right to privacy, the interest in free exercise of religion, and the interest in protecting the
priest-penitent relationship).
38. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 95-96. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at §§
2394-96.
39. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 72.
40. Yellin, supra note 5, at 112. See also Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1560 (1985).
41. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 95.
42. Garnett's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 218 (1606), cited in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20,
at § 2394 n.l.
43. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813). This is an unreported case found in I
W.L.J. 109 (1843), cited in Tinnelly, Privileged Communications to Clergymen, I CATH.
LAW. 198 (1955). See also Yellin, supra note 5, at 104. See also 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note
20, at § 2394 n.7.
44. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 96. According to Yellin, only 70 cases have dealt with
the privilege between 1658 and 1980.
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priest-penitent privilege based its decision on the free exercise of religion
clause of the first amendment."' In People v. Phillips, a priest refused to
testify because his knowledge involving the investigation was derived from
his functions as a Roman Catholic priest.4 The priest was engaged in the
administration of penance, one of the seven Sacraments of his church, when
he learned of the child abuse. The priest argued that since his knowledge
was obtained through the sacrament of penance, he was bound by the canons of his church and the obligations of his clerical office to inviolable
secrecy.' The court agreed and held that to deny the privilege would infringe upon the Catholic priest's and the penitent's free exercise of
religion.

48

Free exercise of religion failed to remain a consistent reason for granting confidentiality to a confession.4 9 The free exercise argument failed to
sustain confidentiality for a confession to a Protestant minister.50 In People
v. Smith, the court distinguished People v. Phillips by finding that the minister in the case at bar was a Protestant and thus, not bound by the seal and
sanctity of the confessional, as a confidential confession was not a sacrament of the Protestant Church.5 1 Although the Protestant minister was
bound by an oath of secrecy in his function as a minister, the court denied
the confidentiality of the privilege." Thus, confidentiality was only granted
when confidentiality of confession was a basic tenet of the church.
In response to the inconsistent and harsh denial of confidentiality to
confessions, legislatures across the country enacted priest-penitent privilege
statutes. 5 New York enacted the first statute." The New York statute
45. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 209. The court said religious freedom was guaranteed by
the constitution and consecrated by the social compact. The court further said:
In this country there is no alliance between church and state ... but religious freedom
[is] guaranteed by the constitution and consecrated by the social compact.
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should be administered -

that its ceremonies as well as its essentials should be protected ....

To decide

that the minister shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare that there
shall be no penance; and this important branch of the Roman catholic religion would be
thus annihilated.
Id. at 207.
46. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 199.
47. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 200.
48. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 207.
49. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 106.
50. See People v. Smith, N.Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817). This case was not officially
reported, but is cited in Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 209.
51. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 211. See also Yellin, supra note 5, at 106.
52. Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 209.
53. See PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
54. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. III, art. 8 (1828), quoted by Tinnelly,
supra note 43, at 213. The statute read: "No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomina-

tion whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional
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granted confidentiality to confessions made to a minister when secrecy of
confessions was a rule or practice of the religion." By granting confidentiality in such instances, the New York legislature eliminated the restricted
interpretation in Phillips, which basically limited the application of the
privilege to sacramental confessions of the Catholic Church." Although all
have different requirements and applications, forty-nine states, the District
of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have statutes dealing with the priest7
penitent privilege.5
C.

Modern Application of the Priest-PenitentPrivilege

1. Clergyman
Although every state codified its own version of a priest-penitent privilege, the majority of the statutes generally contain five prerequisites to application of confidentiality.56 One common prerequisite is that the communication must have been made to a "clergyman."" The definition of who
qualifies as a clergyman varies from state to state depending upon the
state's method of classification. 0 Thus, the general application of the priestpenitent privilege will depend upon the individual state's privilege statute.
However, the majority of states limit the application of the privilege to
communications made to those defined as clergymen.61
One interpretation of who should be classified as clergymen was explained in In Re Murtha." In Murtha, a nun attempted to invoke the
priest-penitent privilege when asked to testify to confessions made to her by
a member of the church.6" The court denied the privilege since Murtha was
not a clergyman within the definition of the statute nor the canons of the
religion." Thus, the definition of a clergyman was limited by the statute
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination."

Id.
55. See Tinnelly, supra note 43, at 213.
56. Yellin, supra note 5, at 106.
57. See PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
58. See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 6. Generally, for the priest-penitent privilege
to apply, the testimony sought must deal with: i)a confidential communication; 2)made to a
clergyman; 3)who is acting in his professional character; 4)for religious or spiritual purposes;
and 5)confidentiality must be a discipline enjoined of the church or denomination. Id. at 6.
59. See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 7.
60. For example, twenty-four states specifically define the term "clergymen." Twentyfive states compile a list of persons considered "clergymen." Three states, Louisiana, Nevada
and Rhode Island, state only that "clergymen" are given the privilege without any listing or
definition. See PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
61. See Smith, supra note 5, at 7. See also Yellin, supra note 5, at 115.
62. 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889 (1971).
63. Id. at 380, 279 A.2d at 890.
64. Id. at 383, 279 A.2d at 892.
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and church canons. In a similar case involving a nun who attempted to
invoke the privilege, the court in Masquat v. McGuire refused to grant the
privilege of confidentiality; the court held that at the time the nun received
the communication, she was acting in her capacity as a hospital administrator and not as a spiritual counselor. 6 Although the Masquat court denied
application of the privilege to the nun, the ruling left open the possibility
that the general definition of "clergyman" was governed by the function,
and thus, might include a nun acting as a spiritual counselor. 6
The general definition of "clergymen" was recently extended to include
a nun acting as a spiritual director.6" Sister Dominic, the nun in Eckmann
v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorn School Dist.,6" served as a spiritual director. Sister Dominic submitted affidavits showing that the office of spiritual
director was a recognized office within the Catholic Church.6 9 The evidence
also showed that both sisters and priests performed the function of spiritual
director. 70 The court held that Sister Dominic was in such a position and
performed such a function as to entitle her to the priest-penitent privilege.7 1
Therefore, "clergymen" has been functionally defined to encompass those
persons acting as spiritual directors/advisors, including nuns.
2.

Professional Capacity

Closely related to the question of who is a clergyman under the priestpenitent privilege statute is the second prerequisite-that the communica78
tion must be made to a clergyman acting in his professional capacity.
That is, if the communication is made to the clergyman conversationally or
as between friends, the relationship and communication is not protected by
the priest-penitent privilege.7 8 Thus, the confidentiality of the privilege is
granted only under limited circumstances.7 4

65.
66.

638 P. 2d 1105 (Okla. 1981).
Id. at 1106.

67.

106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985).

68. Id. at 71.
69. Id. at 72.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 73.
72. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 121-24. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 11.
73. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 121; Smith, supra note 5, at 11. See also Keenan v.
Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); In re
Fuhrer, 100 Misc.2d 315, 320, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1979) (both disallowing privilege where
priest was implicated in crime).
74. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 121. Because the priest-penitent privilege is a derogation
from the general rule that courts are entitled to every person's testimony, courts strictly apply
this prerequisite. Thus, not all communications to a clergyman are privileged. Id.
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3. Spiritual Communication
A third prerequisite deals with the content of the communication. 5
That is, the communication must be related to religion or religious guidance. Every state, in varying degree, has limited the realm of protected
communications.7 6 Vermont, for example, has limited the privilege to state-

ments made in "the sanctity of a religious confession.

' 77

The majority of

states, however, have less restrictive limits, and some allow the privilege to
be invoked for any communication that is made in the course of spiritual
78
guidance.
4.

Confidential in Character

The fourth prerequisite for application of the priest-penitent privilege

is that the communicant intend the communication be confidential in character. 76 Hence, a priest must testify to matters that do not involve confidential communications."0 This requirement was illustrated in In Re Williams.81 In Williams, a priest refused to testify to all matters, including
issues that would not involve confidential communications.8 " Since the testimony sought would not have involved or violated a confidential communication, the priest was required to testify. Because the priest refused, he was
75. Smith, supra note 5, at 10-11 (if the communication is not related in some way to
religion or religious guidance, then the privilege does not apply).
76. Yellin, supra note 5, at 121.
77. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1607 (1973). Several states have limited the protection to
those communications that involve confessions, spiritual advice, and marriage counselling.
Twelve states have restricted the application of the privilege to confessions. See PRIEST-PENiTENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
78. States that apply the privilege to all confidential communications made to a clergyman include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Texas. See PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
79. Smith, supra note 5, at 6. The privilege does not apply if the communication was not
confidential in character. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 2285. This prerequisite fulfills the first prong of Wigmore's privilege test, which requires that the communication originate in confidence. Id.
80. See Smith, supra note 5, at 10. See also Keenan, 47 N.Y.2d at 166, 390 N.E.2d at
1154, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979) (priest's invocation of privilege denied as the testimony sought did not deal with confidential communication nor did the testimony deal with
spiritual communications).
81. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967). The court held that since no
confidential communication was involved the priest-penitent privilege statute was inapplicable.
Further, the court held that the lack of confidential confessions prevented a free exercise argument. Id.
82. Id. at 70, 152 S.E.2d at 319.
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jailed for contempt of court. 88 Similarly, in People v. Thompson, the communication between the defendant and the priest was held to be non-confidential in nature." The defendant, a penitent, gave the priest information
that he intended to be relayed to the penitent's attorney for purposes of plea
bargaining.8" As in Williams, since the communication was not intended to
be kept confidential, the privilege did not apply."s
5. Discipline Enjoined
The fifth prerequisite found in many states is that confidentiality must
be part of the "discipline enjoined" by the church.87 In other words, the
denomination must require confidentiality of communication as part of its
discipline before the privilege of confidentiality will be granted to communications between the denomination's ministers and members.88 The factor,
when required, is interpreted in varying degrees of restrictiveness.89 A
broad interpretation of this requirement appears in In Re Swenson, which
recognized that all churches have as a discipline enjoined the confidentiality
of confessions. 90 However, not all states use this broad interpretation of the
"discipline enjoined" requirement, and for those states that have a restricted interpretation of the discipline enjoined requirement, the application of the privilege is greatly restricted. 1 The practical effect of the "discipline enjoined" requirement is that churches are forced to formally enact
and adopt rules making confidential communications a part of the religious
practice.
All of these requirements limit the application and scope of the priest83.

Id.

84. People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 422, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982).
85. Id. at 426, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
86.

Id.

87. Twenty-two states require confidentiality as a part of the "discipline enjoined" of the
religion. The states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, The District of Columbia, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, The Virgin Islands, and Washington. See PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES, supra note 3.
88. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 126. See also Kuhlman, Communications to Clergymen-When Are They Privileged? 2 VAL. U.L. REV. 265, 268 (1967).

89. See Kuhlman, supra note 88, at 274-75. See also Smith, supra note 5, at 11-13;
Yellin, supra note 5, at 126. The rationales and interpretations of this requirement vary from
state to state. In the strictest interpretation it would be limited to the Catholic Church. Id.
90. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931). Swenson was a divorce case in
which a Lutheran minister claimed the privilege for confessions made by the husband. The
court held that since the communication was for spiritual guidance the priest-penitent privilege
applied. See also Yellin, supra note 5, at 133. The Swenson interpretation used to be the most
liberal judicial interpretation of the "discipline enjoined" requirement, but is now commonly
used. Id.
91. Smith, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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penitent privilege. For most states the privilege will not apply unless the
testimony sought deals with a communication made in confidence to a clergyman acting in his professional capacity." Some states limit application of
the privilege further with the "discipline enjoined" requirement.9 3 Clearly,
the statutory scope of the privilege is by no means broadly applied. In fact
the privilege may be too narrowly applied where it is restricted to sacramental confessions. 94 Regardless of how limited the priest-penitent privilege
already is, the expanded applications of the child abuse reporting statutes
may result in further unjustified restrictions upon the privilege.

III.
A.

CHILD ABUSE REPORTING STATUTES

History

Child abuse has existed in the United States for over two hundred
years. 95 In many situations, child abuse has gone unnoticed except in the
most serious circumstances. 6 In part, child abuse was unrecognized because parents were given the broadest discretion in raising and disciplining
their children. 97 The earliest statutes prohibiting child abuse were directed
only at the most serious cases of abuse." Therefore, a broad range of child
abuse was not illegal, and many children were unprotected. 99
In the early 1960s, the problem of child abuse became more public
with the medical profession's recognition of what was termed the "battered
child syndrome."' 100 In all fifty states, as well as the Virgin Islands and the
District of Columbia, child abuse reporting statutes were enacted to confront the problem of undetected child abuse.' 0' In 1974, Congress passed
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to aid in attacking the
92. Yellin, supra note 5,at 149-50.
93. Yellin, supra note 5, at 149-50. Yellin argues, however, that the "discipline enjoined" requirement should be abolished. Instead he argues the courts should not involve themselves in the doctrine and policy of various religious groups to determine the discipline. Thus,
the courts should take judicial notice that the sharing of confidences with a minister is a legitimate and common practice of all churches and religious denominations. Id. at 150.
94. See generally Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent
Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 20 U. Prr. L. REV. 27 (1967) (Stoyles
argues that where the privilege is applied too narrowly, an establishment of religion occurs, as
the doctrines of the Catholic Church would be advanced in exclusion of others).
95. See Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse
and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458 (1977-1978).
96. Id. at 459.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 650.
100. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered-Child Syndrome,
181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
101.

See REPORTING STATUTES, supra note 7.
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102
problem of child abuse.

The first enactment of child abuse reporting statutes marked the beginning of several legislative attempts to solve the problem of unidentified child
abuse. Initially, child abuse reporting statutes dealt primarily with "identifying" abused children. 10 8 However, the identification of the abused child
was insufficient to combat the problem because the statute lacked provisions
regarding procedures once the abuse was identified. 104 The second enactment of reporting statutes attempted to resolve the problem of investigative
inaction by mandating investigative procedures upon identification of the
abuse. Although this was an important addition, the statutes still lacked
provisions defining relief once child abuse was proven by the investigator.
To resolve this problem, legislatures added provisions dealing with relief
and remedies in the form of state intervention. Thus, present reporting statutes deal with identification, investigation, and intervention in cases of child
abuse.10 5 The overall effectiveness of each state's child abuse statute depends, however, upon the elements that make up the statute's structure.
B.

Present Application of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes

Although each state has enacted a different version of a child abuse
reporting statute, the statutes all contain common elements in their basic
structure and scope.'" The purpose clause' 07 of the reporting statutes states
the legislative intent. The intent behind most child abuse reporting statutes
is threefold: 1) early identification; 2) mandated investigation; and 3) intervention where appropriate.1°8 The mandatory and permissive reporting sections define the people required or permitted to report.10 9 Over the years,
the list of those required to report has grown to include several professionals
outside of the medical profession." 0 Today, those included in the list of
mandated reporters could be categorized as those people whose professions
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (Supp. IV 1974). The act allocates money to be distributed
to each state that meets the conditions set out in the act. The passage of the act has played a
major part in the states' efforts to combat child abuse through reporting statutes.
103. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 650.
104. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 650.
105. See Besharov, supra note 95, at 464.
106. Fraser, supra note 9, at 650. The reason the states have a common format is due in
part to the requirements of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which requires the
states to meet ten conditions to be eligible for federal funds.
107. Fraser, supra note 9, at 651. See also Besharov, supra note 95, at 464.
108. Fraser, supra note 9, at 651.
109. Fraser, supra note 9, at 656.
110. Fraser, supra note 9, at 657. Initially the physician was singled out as the sole,
mandated reporter. However, the whole medical profession was later added to the group of
professionals required to report. Today the group of mandated reporters has become even
broader with the addition of teachers, policemen, and social workers. Id.
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bring them into contact with children and families.
The sections of the child abuse reporting statutes that determine when
a person or professional must make a report have also evolved since the
enactment of the first reporting statute. "1 Initially, a report was required
when child abuse was suspected.' 1 2 Today, however, reports are also required when the reporter observes the child being threatened under circumstances which would reasonably result in abuse." 3 This addition of required
reports of potential abuse helps to protect and identify the child prior to the
occurrence of severe abuse."'
Legislatures added an immunity section to reporting statutes to elicit
the cooperation during the identification stage from individuals who would
not otherwise comply with the statute for fear of being sued if an investigation failed to find child abuse."' The immunity section gives a child abuse

reporter immunity from civil and criminal liability when a report of suspected child abuse is made in good faith." 6 Reports of suspected child
abuse are also encouraged by a section that abrogates certain statutory
privileges in cases of suspected child abuse." 7 This section removes an obstacle to certain professionals who would otherwise be unable to report or
testify in cases of suspected child abuse because of the confidentiality of a
statutory privilege."" By having these privileges abrogated in cases involving child abuse, the investigators and the courts are able to discover the
facts of abuse that otherwise would remain secret. The system is thus better
able to protect the child." 9
Ill.
112.

See Fraser, supra note 9, at 659-60.

See Fraser, supra note 9, at 659.

113. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 659-60.
114. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 660. See also Besharov, supra note 95, at 465.
115. Fraser, supra note 9, at 663. See also Saltzman, Protection for the Child or the
Parent? The Conflict Between the Federal Drug and Alcohol Abuse Confidentiality Requirements and the State Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Laws, 1985 S.I.U.L.J. 181, 183
(1985).
116. In sixteen states a report of suspected child abuse carries a presumption of good

faith. The sixteen states are: Arkansas, Colorado, The District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, REPORTING STATUTES, supra note 7.
117.
118.
119.

Fraser, supra note 9, at 664.
Fraser, supra note 9, at 664.
Cf. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One,
50 MINN. L. REV. I, 34-36 (1965). McCoid challenges the wisdom of expanding the group of
mandated reporters from physicians to others. In part, McCoid argues for non-expansion due

to the confidential duty some professionals owe to the adult abuser. By requiring professionals
like the attorney and priest to report, the reporting statutes place the professional in a precarious position in regard to their obligations owed to the adult abuser. Also, McCoid argues that
physicians, by the nature of their profession are more likely to be aware of the existence of
child abuse than an attorney or priest. Id.
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CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AND CHILD

ABUSE REPORTING STATUTES

The conflict between the privilege statutes and reporting statutes invokes several questions involving the effect of the reporting statute and the
status of the priest-penitent privilege. In regard to the abrogation of privileges for certain professional relationships, a question arises as to whether it
is in the child's best interest to repeal the privilege and require a report.12 0
As for the priest-penitent relationship, questions arise as to whether the
privilege is abrogated, and as to the application and effect the reporting
statute has on the privilege. The questions invoked by the conflict could be

resolved by examining the overlap that occurs between the statutes.
Overlap between the privilege and the reporting statute occurs in two
ways. First, if the priest is required to report suspected child abuse and his
suspicion of abuse is based upon a privileged confidential communication,
the priest must choose between two conflicting duties. A priest faces a penalty regardless of which duty he chooses to uphold. 21 If the priest reports
the child abuse, he faces potential penalties from his church and also violates the priest-penitent privilege statute; if he does not report, then he
faces prosecution under the reporting statute. The statutes and duties can
also conflict if the reporting statute requires the priest to testify in cases
involving child abuse. Again, if the priest's knowledge of the child abuse
was obtained in a confidential communication, then by testifying the priest
would violate his sacred trust. If the priest refuses to testify, then he may
be held in contempt of court and possibly sentenced to jail. In both situations, the priest's knowledge and suspicions of child abuse that are obtained
in a confidential communication pose a serious dilemma for the priest, the
resolution of which may or may not be found in the statutes.
Whether a resolution to his problem can be found within the conflicting priest-penitent privilege or child abuse reporting statutes depends upon
several statutory variables. 22 One variable that effects the resolution is
120. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 649. See also Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980). Smith argues that the state's interest in preventing child abuse is not significantly advanced by laws requiring psychotherapists to
report all instances of child abuse discovered during therapy. If therapy is not granted confidentiality, abusers will not seek treatment for the problems that cause them to abuse their
children. Id.
121. For example, if a Catholic priest violates a confidence of the confessional, he will be
excommunicated from his office and the church. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 110, citing Ponder, Will Your Pastor Tell?, Liberty, May-June, 1978, at 2,3. On the other hand, if the priest
fails to report or testify when mandated, he is subject to legal penalties under the reporting
statute. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 665.
122. For each state the resolution of the priest's dilemma will be dependent upon the
combination of reporting and abrogation sections in the reporting statute.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/8

Ivers: When Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse Reporting Statute?

1987]

PRIESTS' CONFLICTING DUTIES

447

whether the priest is a mandated reporter under the child abuse reporting
statute. If the priest is merely a permissive reporter, the solution to the
conflict is different because in this situation there would be no conflict of
duties regarding a report of child abuse. Another variable which will affect
the resolution is whether the child abuse reporting statute abrogates the
priest-penitent privilege. The priest must ask if the privilege is abrogated,
and under what circumstances it is abrogated. For example, the privilege
may be repealed in all cases of child abuse, or it may be repealed only when
the priest has made the report. Also, the question of whether the state has a
testimonial privilege for the priest-penitent relationship will affect the resolution for testimonial purposes. Finally, the combinations of these variables
will also affect the possible resolutions and, thus, should be examined in
order to ascertain the legislature's intent and to obtain a justifiable
resolution.
One possible combination of these statutory variables would be a child
abuse reporting statute that explicitly requires the priest to report and explicitly abrogates the privileged communication.2 3 In this situation, there
would seemingly be no uncertainty as to the effect of the statutory overlap.
However, the degree to which this situation will advance the purposes of the
reporting statute seems uncertain and may even have a negative effect on
the statute's purposes.124 If priests are required to report and testify in all
cases of child abuse, the parent abuser may not confess his offense of child
abuse to the priest.1 2 Thus, the priest may never become aware of the
abuse, and the child would still be endangered.
A child abuse reporting statute that explicitly requires the priest to
report child abuse, but does not explicitly abrogate the privilege, would be
another combination of these sections." 6 In this situation, the priest is left
with the uncertainty of the effect of making a required report. Another
combination would be the child abuse statute that implicitly requires the
priest to report but does not abrogate the privilege. 27 Again, the question
123. An example of this statutory combination is found in NEV. REv. STAT. §§
432B.010-.400 (1986). Nevada requires the priest to report and also abrogates privileges. The
statute reads in part: "Reports must be made by every attorney, clergyman, social worker,
school authority, and teacher. Further, evidence . .shall not be excluded on the ground that
the matter would otherwise be privileged against disclosure under chapter 40 of NRS."
124. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 657. See also McCoid, supra note 119, at 27. McCoid
argues that the group of mandated reporters should be limited to the medical profession.
125. See generally Smith, supra note 120, at I (like the patient in the psychotherapistpatient relationship, the penitent would be deterred from confessing child abuse if the communication was not kept confidential).
126. An example of this statutory combination is found in CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-38a
to -38f (Supp. 1986). The Connecticut reporting statute requires the clergyman who has reason to suspect child abuse or neglect to report. However, the statute does not repeal the priestpenitent privilege.
127. An example of this statutory combination is found in I I PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§
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arises as to what effect a report would have on the priest's duty under the
privilege.
Two other possible combinations would also cause conflicting duties for
the priest. One combination would involve a child abuse reporting statute
that does not require the priest to report, but abrogates the communicant's
privilege.12 8 Again, the priest would be uncertain as to what status a confidential communication made to him would have. A second combination
would be a reporting statute that makes the priest a permissive reporter and
does not abrogate the communications privilege.'" 9 Again, the application
of the privilege would be uncertain if the priest believed a report was necessary. Although the legislatures of all states meant to achieve clarity in the
child abuse reporting statutes, all of the above mentioned statutory combinations have the potential of leaving the priest in turmoil as to what his
responsibilities may be in child abuse cases.
The priest is confronted with a priest-penitent privilege statute and a
child abuse reporting statute which conflict and present the priest with unclear duties. This lack of clarity is seen in the several combinations of the
reporting statutes and privilege statutes. Compounding the problem of the
overlap is the application of each statute to the individual circumstances of
each case. Thus, the resolution of the dilemma necessarily depends upon the
states' intended application of the child abuse reporting statute.
V.

RESOLUTION

A resolution to the priest's problem may be found in the basic principles of statutory construction.12 0 Applying principles of statutory construc2201-04 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Pennsylvania requires any person who, in the course of their
employment, occupation, or in the practice of their profession comes into contact with children
shall report suspected cases of child abuse. The statute then lists professionals who may encounter child abuse and be required to report but fails to mention the clergyman as a professional who is required to report.
128. An example of this statutory combination is found in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23 para.
2051-62 (Smith-Hurd 1985). In Illinois the priest is not required, but may report. Thus, the
priest is a permissive reporter. However, the statute abrogates privileges for all those who do
report, as "no evidence shall be excluded by reason of a common law or statutory privilege
relating to communications between the alleged abuser and the reporter of the suspected
abuse."
129. An example of this statutory combination is found in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133618 (1978 & Supp. 1985). Arizona does not list clergymen in the group of mandated reporters. Thus, clergymen are permissive reporters. Also Arizona specifically retains the priest-penitent privilege. As stated in § 13-3620(E) "a clergyman or priest shall not, without his consent
be examined as a witness concerning any confession made to him in his role as a clergyman or
a priest in the course of the "discipline enjoined" by the church to which he belongs."
130.

See C. SANDS, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51 (4th ed. 1984).

Where statutes overlap and unclarity exists as to the effect of the overlap, the courts can use
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tion to the conflict between the privilege and reporting statutes may result
in one solution to the dilemma. A common-law analysis will present a second resolution to this problem.'
An examination of the courts' current
application of the child abuse reporting statute to other statutory privileges
and a comparison with the priest-penitent privilege will provide the common-law solution to the problem.
A. Statutory Analysis

Several factors must be considered in designing a solution to the conflict under a statutory or common-law analysis. Since each statute has its
own separate purpose, the conflict of the privilege and reporting duties
should be resolved by examining the purpose of both statutes in order to
avoid frustrating the purposes of the statutes. The dilemma must also be

resolved in light of the basic circumstances under which the conflicts occur.
Whether the priest received his suspicions based upon an observation or a
communication will affect the resolution. If the circumstances of the conflict and the purposes of the statutes are both considered, a justifiable and
reasonable solution to the priest's problem may be found.
The basic problem faced by the priest is whether protection will be

granted to confidential communications made to him in light of the child
abuse reporting statute. 18 The communication may be subject to disclosure

in a report, or it may be subject to compelled disclosure in proceedings that
result from reports of child abuse. In states where the priest is a mandatory

reporter and the priest-penitent privilege has been abrogated, the communication may not be kept confidential if the communication contains information of child abuse.' 88 However, in states where the priest is required to

report but the privilege is not abrogated, the communication should remain
confidential.' 3 ' In still other states, the priest may not be required to report,
principles of statutory construction to determine the purposes of both statutes and to resolve
the conflict in light of the purposes. Id.
131. Under a common-law analysis the dilemma faced by the priest will be compared to
the dilemma faced by other professionals. Based upon the similarities and dissimilarities of
these professional relationships, a resolution will be proposed.
132. See Comment, supra note 8, at 653. See also Ostling, supra note 6, at 66.
133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983), which states in part, "Any [person] who knows or reasonably suspects child abuse or neglect shall make a report ..
" Further, "The physician-patient privilege, husband-wife privilege, or any privilege except the attorney-client privilege ...

shall not pertain .

.

. in any judicial proceeding resulting from a

report submitted pursuant to this chapter."
134. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3b-1 (Supp. 1986). Utah's statute states in part,
"Whenever any person ... has reason to believe a child has been subject to abuse or observes
a child being subjected to conditions which would reasonably result in . . . abuse

. . .

shall

[report]." Thus, the priest is a mandatory reporter. However, the Utah statute only abrogates
the physician-patient privilege, so the priest-penitent privilege is retained. Id.
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yet the privilege is abrogated.18 ' In these states, the conflict would result in
a violation of the communication's confidentiality in the courtroom if the
priest is required to testify. Finally, there are states which allow, but do not
require the priest to report and that do not abrogate the privilege."3 6 Under
all of these combinations, the priest is presented with a problem when a
confidential communication involves child abuse. However, an analysis using principles of statutory construction will aid in resolving the apparent
conflict.
1. Principles of Statutory Construction
A basic principle of statutory construction dictates that when statutes
relate to the same subject matter, the more recent provision is presumed to
be in accord with the legislative policy of the previous statute, absent an
express repeal or amendment.1 8 7 This principle assumes that whenever the

legislature enacts a provision, it considers previous statutes on the same
subject matter and other related statutes.'" Hence, if statutes cover the
same subject matter, they are construed to be in harmony if reasonably
possible, even though an apparent conflict exists.' 39
The apparent conflict between the priest-penitent privilege and the
child abuse reporting statutes could be resolved under the foregoing principle. Although the statutes deal on a broad scope with completely unrelated
matters, they do overlap, and in a narrower sense, cover the same subject
matter of confidential communication. The crux of the priest-penitent privilege statute is confidential communications. Under the child abuse reporting
statutes, the subject of confidential communications is only a subsection to
the overall subject matter of the statute. Therefore, where possible, the
priest-penitent privilege statute and child abuse reporting statute should be
construed in harmony, unless there is an express repeal or amendment
found in the subsequent statute, in this case the reporting statute. 40
135. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1977 & Supp. 1985). Alabama's statute only requires persons who work with or treat children to report suspected cases of child abuse. How-

ever, the statute also states, "the doctrine of privileged communication, with the exception of
the attorney-client privilege, shall not be a ground for excluding any evidence regarding a
child's injuries or the cause thereof in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant
to this chapter." Id. Thus, the priest-penitent privilege is repealed.
136. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-480 to -560 (Law Co-op. 1985). Id. The South
Carolina statute does not require the priest to report. Thus, the priest is a permissive reporter.
Also, the statute retains the priest-penitent privilege. In part the statute states, "the privileged
quality of communication . . .except that between attorney-client or priest-penitent, is abrogated." Id.
137.

See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 450.

138. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 450.
139. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 450.
140. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 450.
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An intent to repeal may be inferred from a conflict if one statute deals
with the subject matter in general terms and the other statute deals with
the subject matter more specifically.'" If at all possible, the general and
special acts should be harmonized. 4 However, if the conflict is irreconcilable, the special act prevails over the general act unless it appears the legislature intended a contrary interpretation." 4 Thus, whether the provisions in
the child abuse reporting statute repealed the confidentiality granted by the
priest-penitent privilege statute depends upon the intent of the legislature.
2.

Mandatory Reporter and Abrogated Privilege

In states where the child abuse reporting statute requires a report from
the priest and also abrogates the testimonial privilege, the courts could infer
that the legislature intended that every case of suspected abuse be reported
regardless of the origin of the reporter's suspicion."' Further, the legislature apparently intended that all proceedings from such a report be unhindered by privileges.1 4 ' The apparent legislative intent when using this
combination of requirements in their reporting statutes would, in effect, repeal the testimonial privilege for all confidential communications in cases of
suspected child abuse. Whether the legislature intended to require reports
based on all suspicions depends upon an interpretation of the child abuse
reporting statute and an examination of the underlying purposes and interests of the statute.
Theoretically, the suspicions that result in a report or testimony under
the child abuse reporting statute could arise in three potential ways that
would affect the priest-penitent privilege statute. The suspicion could be
based upon a purely confidential communication, a pure observation, or a
confidential communication and observation combined. An initial reading of
the statute suggests that suspicions based on any of the above situations and
relationships would require a report and testimony. However, an examination of the purposes and interests of the reporting statute reveals that this
might not be the case.The purposes of child abuse reporting statutes are: 1)
identification; 2) investigation; and 3) intervention." 4 The section requiring
reports deals primarily with the identification purpose. Under the reporting
section, the legislature could have intended the requirements to compel a
report of abuse under all circumstances leading up to a suspicion of abuse.
According to State v. Fagalde, reportable suspicions of abuse include com141.
142.
143.
144.

See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
See, e.g., II PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2201-04 (Purdon Supp. 1986), supra note

145.
146.

See Fraser, supra note 9, at 664.
See Fraser, supra note 9, at 645-48.

127.
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munications between psychotherapists and their patients. 47 Under this interpretation, the statute gives priority to identifying child abuse even if it
requires the court to infringe upon a confidential communication. Other
courts restrict this interpretation to allow for the infringement upon the
psychotherapist privilege when there are no other means available to the
court.1 4 8 Some legislatures, however, appear to have limited the reportable

suspicions to "observed" circumstances or conditions of the child that would
arouse suspicion of abuse."" Accepting this limitation, the reporting section
could be construed to be in harmony with the privilege statute's purpose of
keeping confessional-type communications confidential, because a pure
"communication" would not fall within the category of a pure "observation" of child abuse. Thus, a report would not be required from a priest if
the suspicion is based upon a pure communication or a communication coupled with observation.
The reporting statutes could be interpreted to limit reports to suspicions based on pure observations of potential child abuse, when the relationship between a priest and penitent is involved. An examination of the reporting statutes reveals a purpose of identifying and protecting abused
children, rather than a purpose of locating child abusers.' 50 Thus, limiting
reports to suspicions based upon pure observations of the child would be
reasonable. Accordingly, if a priest obtains suspicions from a confidential
communication with the abuser, a report would not be required because the
suspicion would not be based on a pure observation of the child. Also, if a
priest's suspicions were based upon observations of a child during a confidential communication with the child he would not be required to report.
However, if the priest observed the child in the absence of a confidential
communication, a report would be required, and the privilege statute would
not be violated. By limiting the priest's required reports to suspicions based
on pure observations, the reporting section of the child abuse reporting statute could be construed in harmony with the privilege statute, without vio147. State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 733, 539 P.2d 86, 90 (1975). Fagalde involved
a conflict between psychotherapist-patient privilege and duty to report, and held that the abro-

gation of the privilege under the Child Abuse Reporting Act included the communications
between the therapist and child abuse. Thus, for the psychotherapist in Washington, reports of
child abuse are not limited to observed suspicions. Id.
148. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 514, 694 Cal. Rptr. 431, 437 (1983). This
case dealt with the conflict between psychologist-patient privilege and the child abuse reporting statute. The court held the psychologist was not a under a duty to make a second report of
suspicions upon further counseling of the abuser. Id.
149. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (1981). Mississippi clearly limits mandatory
reports of child abuse to "observed" suspicions.
150. See State v. Groff, 409 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The courts refused
to convict a psychiatrist for not reporting when he had not treated the child. The court held a
mandatory report was qualified by the terms "serving the children."Id.
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lating the purposes of either.' 5'
The section in the reporting statutes that abrogates the testimonial
privilege is more closely related to the purposes of investigation and intervention. However, for some states the abrogation clause also applies to the
identification purpose. Under the investigation and intervention process, the
legislature attempts to protect the child and provide treatment for the family if deemed appropriate. 53 Again, conflict exists between the two statutes.
Apparently, the reporting statutes expressly repeal the privilege for all confidential communications in all cases involving child abuse, since the statutes appear to repeal all privileges regardless of who made the report or
how the reporter obtained his suspicions of abuse. If the statutory principle,
which states that the specific governs over the general, were applied, the
reporting statute would govern over the privilege statute since it limits the
privilege by imposing a specific exception. 8 3 However, the statutes must be
154
construed together whenever possible, absent an express repeal.
The statutes can be construed together in the context of testifying in
the states that have abrogated all privileges, if the legislature did not intend
to abrogate the privilege for all confidential communications with regard to
all cases of child abuse. If the legislature only abrogated the privilege for
observations of an abused child during a confidential communication, then a
more harmonious interpretation would exist.' 55 Although this interpretation
could still have a chilling effect on confidential communications, the purpose of confidential communications and the priest-penitent relationship
could still be protected.
The practical result of this interpretation would limit testimony to
cases where the priest obtains his suspicions during a confidential communication with a child he observes and suspects is abused. Also, it would not
repeal the confidentiality of a communication between the priest and parent/abuser. Hence, a confidential confession made to the priest would be
retained because the privilege would only be repealed in the limited circumstances in which the priest's observations of the child lead to a suspicion of
abuse. Therefore, the essential element of trust between the priest and penitent would remain in this relationship, and at the same time, the privilege
151. This interpretation may also be supported by the statutory langauge. See, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (1981), which states in part: "Any [person] having reasonable
cause to suspect that a child brought to him or . . . of whom he has knowledge through
observation is . . . abused . . . shall . . . report."
152. Fraser, supra note 9, at 648.
153. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
154. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
155. This interpretation seems reasonable in light of Mississippi's statute and the other

like statutes, as all require reports from professionals who come into contact with the abused
child and not necessarily with the abuser. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 658.
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would not bar the priest from testifying as to "observations" of a child he
suspects is abused.
3.

Mandatory Reporter-Privilege Not Abrogated

In states where the reporting statute requires the priest to report child
abuse but does not abrogate the priest-penitent privilege, the status of the
confidential communication is challenged only in the context of the required
report and not in the context of required testimony.166 This apparent conflict can be reconciled and the statutes can be construed harmoniously by
interpreting the reporting requirement to encompass only observed suspicions of child abuse, 157 when dealing with a priest. Under this interpretation, the priest would be required to report when his suspicions of child
abuse arise from his observations. Arguably, the courts could interpret
these statutes to require the priest to report even if his suspicions were
based upon confidential communications. However, in these states the legislatures have not repealed the priest-penitent privilege; yet, they have repealed the privileges for other professionals who are required to report.158
The legislature apparently intended to retain the status of the priest-penitent privilege, since an expression of certain exceptions is generally intended
to be an exclusion of others.15 ' Following this approach, the priest could be
required to report suspected cases of child abuse; thus, the identification
purpose of the reporting statute would be fulfilled without violating the
privilege statute's purpose of keeping communications confidential.
The interpretation of the child abuse reporting statute that requires a
report only when the suspicion is based upon an observation is reasonable
and justifiable when the reporting requirement is examined in light of the
entire statute. 60 The first indication that the priest is only required to report suspicions based on observation is that the statute has not abrogated
the priest-penitent privilege." 1 In retaining the privilege that applies to
"communications," the legislature basically exempts confidential communi10
cations from the factors that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of abuse. 2
156. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
157. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.010-.090 (Baldwin Supp. 1986) (effective July !,
1987). An examination of the list of mandated reporters reveals that they all work with children or come into visual contact with children.
158. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
159. Koerner v. Westland, 48 i1. App. 3d 172, 177, 362 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1977).
(dealing with exceptions to psychiatrist-patient privilege and holding the testimony was erroneously admitted in lieu of the privilege statute).
160. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 454. By interpreting the statute in light of its
development, we are better able to determine the legislature's intent.
161. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
162. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 453. If a report were required in this situation,
then the legislature would have to specifically state and abrogate the privilege. Otherwise, the
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Another factor within the reporting requirement that seems to limit
reportable abuse to cases of observed suspicion involves a recent addition to
the circumstances under which a report must be made. Originally, a report
had to be made whenever the person had reason to suspect that the child
was abused. 163 However, today a report is required when the person has
reason to suspect the child was abused or observes a child being subjected
to conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse.'"'
This addition to instances in which reports are required qualifies the previous requirement since the term "observes" is used. Hence, a reasonable interpretation of the circumstances that would lead to a required report includes instances where a person observes a child who has been abused or
who observes a child being subjected to conditions that will result in abuse;
then the professional must report.
The specific exemptions and limitations within the reporting sections
themselves also indicate that the suspicion should be based upon "observations" rather than "confidential communications." Oregon places an exemption within the reporting section that excludes from required reports those
suspicions that are based upon a confidential communication.' 6 5 Arizona
limits the duty to report to observations that give rise to a suspicion of
abuse. 66 From these statutes, it becomes apparent that the priest could be
required to report without violating confidential communications under the
privilege statute, because the statutes specifically exempt reports where the
suspicion is based upon confidential communications. 16 Similarly, priests of
other states that require reports, but that do not abrogate privileges, could
also report without violating confidential communications. In these states,
the priest should be required to report his observed and non-confidential
suspicions of child abuse. This would be a reasonable interpretation of the
reporting requirement because the legislature has retained the priest-penitent privilege. By interpreting the reporting requirement in this manner, the
reporting statutes and the priest-penitent privilege statute could exist harmoniously because priests would be able to report child abuse yet retain the
confidentiality of penitential communications.
4.

Permissive Reporter-Privilege Abrogated

In states where the reporting statute permits, but does not require the
priest to report, and the reporting statute abrogates the priest-penitent privoverlapping statutes are construed in harmony. Id. at 453, 550.
163. See Fraser, supra note 9, at 659-60.
164. See, e.g., NEs. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1985).
165. OR. REv. STAT. § 418.762 (1980).
166. ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 1986).
167. See text accompanying note 146. As mentioned previously, the priest could report
observed suspicions of abuse without violating the confidence of the privilege.
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'
ilege, there is also an apparent conflict. 68
The conflict arises in the reporting statute's apparent elimination of privileges in all cases of child abuse.
This conflict could be resolved by applying the statutory principle that a
specific statute dealing with privileges governs over a more general statute.169 Under this principle, the abrogation of the privilege in cases of child
abuse would be a justified exception to the general rule. However, absent a
clear express repeal, courts should try to construe the conflicting statutes in
a manner that advances and furthers the intent and purposes of both
170
statutes.

Construing these two statutes in a manner that would further the purposes of both may seem impossible, because it appears that the reporting
17 1
statutes abrogate the priest-penitent privilege in all cases of child abuse.
This would be a reasonable interpretation if this clause were examined in
isolation. The reporting statute as a whole, however, reveals that an express
repeal of the priest-penitent privilege may not exist.
Two states expressly refer to the priest's privilege;173 the remaining
17 3
states speak in general terms of a professional-client or patient privilege.
For the states that expressly mention the priest's privilege, the rule of construing statutes together seems inapplicable, and hence, in cases involving
child abuse there would be no priest-penitent privilege. However, the abrogation clause is only one section of the child abuse statute, and the scope
and application is limited and should be interpreted in light of the statute
as a whole.17 4 Following this principle, the abrogation of the priest-penitent
privilege may be limited to a narrow set of circumstances which allows for
a construction that forwards the purposes of both, without violating the
general interests of either.
168. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
169. See C. SANDS, supra note 130, at 499.
170. See generally C. SANDS, supra note 130, § 51.05.
171. A reading of the abrogation section alone gives the impression that if suspected
child abuse is reported, then the investigatory board can go behind all doors, including the
confessional doors, to ask questions concerning child abuse. For example, see LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403(F) (West 1986).
172. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-815 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F)
(West 1986).
173. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2060 (SmithHurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1521 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:403(F) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011 (Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Vernon 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-204 (1986); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Baldwin 1985); OKLA
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (West Supp. 1987); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2532 (Supp. 1985); W.
VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (1986).
174. See C. SANDS, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53.01 (4th ed.
1984). The principle that statutes involving different subject matter should be construed harmoniously, also includes the construction of different sections within the same statute.
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The purposes and interests of the reporting statute and the priest-penitent privilege statute can both be furthered if the abrogation clause in the
reporting statute is limited to the privileged relationship between the priest
and the abused child. Under this interpretation, the purpose of the reporting statute's abrogation clause would be furthered because evidence could
be obtained as to the origin of the abused child's injury through the priest's
contact with the child. At the same time, the priest-penitent privilege would
remain in effect as to confidences between the priest and the parent. Under
this limitation, the priest, after seeing the child, could report to the authorities if he felt it was in the child's best interest. Furthermore, the priest
could participate and aid in the follow-up investigation and the priest-penitent relationship could remain intact because his knowledge could be based
solely upon his observations of the child. Thus, this limitation and interpretation of the abrogation clause would harmonize the reporting and privilege
statutes in these two states.
The other states have statutes that do not require the priest to report,
but which seemingly abrogate the priest-penitent privilege through a general provision. These statutes can also be interpreted in such a way that the
priest-penitent privilege is not violated.17 5 Again, a harmonious construction
can be achieved by interpreting the abrogation clause in light of the statute
as a whole.
Typically, the clause that abrogates privileges is interconnected with
the clause requiring reports. 7 6 For example, Oklahoma's abrogation clause
states that the contents of a report shall not be excluded on grounds of
privilege.'" Illinois, New Mexico, and Montana also abrogate privileges
with reference to the effect of a privilege on a report.178 For states that
abrogate privileges only in connection with a report, the abrogation clause
could be reasonably interpreted to abrogate only the privileges of those who
are required or who do report. Thus, when the priest is merely a permissive
reporter and when the priest does not make a report, the priest-penitent
privilege is not in conflict with the abrogation clause.
An examination of other abrogation clauses reveals that their scope
may be limited by the specific wording of the clauses. West Virginia, for
example, abrogates privileged communications between any "professional
175. Cf. CP v. Laramie County Dep't. of Pub. Assistance and Social Serv., 648 P.2d
512, 517 (Wyo. 1982) (involving abrogation of privileges in light of child abuse reporting
statute and holding that the statute did not limit the abrogation clause to communications
between the child and physician, but also extends to communications between adult abuser and
physician).
176. See text accompanying notes 139-46.
177. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (West Supp. 1987).
178. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. § 2060 (Smith-Hurd 1986); MONT. CoDa ANN. §
41-3-204 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-16 (1986).
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person and his patient or his client."' 179 Under this wording the privilege
between a physician and patient and between the social worker and client
would be abrogated. However, this wording does not necessarily abrogate
the privilege between the priest and penitent as the priest-penitent relationship is unique and, strictly speaking, is not a professional-client or patient
relationship. As commonly defined a client is a customer or person who has
engaged the services of another."" A patient is defined as a person who is
under some type of medical treatment."" A penitent is one who seeks to
atone for past sins by confession to a priest. 82 Hence, a harmonious construction can be achieved between the abrogation clause and the priest-penitent privilege when the abrogation clause speaks in terms of a professionalclient or patient privilege, if the terms are given a strict interpretation. Abrogation clauses that refer to professional-client privileges or that seem to
intertwine the abrogated privileges with the reporting clauses can be construed to prevent conflict with the priest-penitent privilege.
In states where the abrogation clause repeals privileges solely for the
purpose of revealing evidence in a child abuse proceeding, a harmonious
construction may also be achieved with the priest-penitent privilege.'13 A
stricter and more reasonable interpretation of this type of clause would be
that the doctrine of privileged communications is repealed only in regard to
those who are required or who do report. Under this interpretation, the evidence of the child's injuries obtained through a medical professional-patient
relationship would be admissible evidence in proceedings that result from a
report of abuse. However, evidence of a penitent's confidential communication to a priest would not be admissible where the priest has not made a
report. Thus, when the abrogation clause is interpreted in light of the reporting section of the statute, and limited to reports required and/or made,
a harmonious construction can be achieved.
5. Permissive Reporter-Privilege Not Abrogated
A final category of reporting statutes involves statutes that do not require the priest to report and do not abrogate the priest-penitent privilege.'" In states with this combination of clauses, there should be no over§ 49-6A-7 (1986).
Client is defined as "a person who engages the professional advice or services of
another." WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 248 (1984).
181. Patient is defined as "an individual awaiting or under medical care and treatment."
Id. at 863.
182. Penitent is defined as "a person who repents sin; a person under church censor but
admitted to penance especially under the direction of a confessor." Id. at 870.
183. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1986). Alabama abrogates the privilege in regard to reports
of child abuse.
184. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
179.
180.

W. VA. CODE
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lap or conflict with the priest-penitent privilege statute. However, conflict
between reporting procedures and the privilege may arise if the priest
wishes to report a suspected case of abuse.
When a priest wishes to report suspected child abuse and the priestpenitent privilege has not been abrogated, a conflict of duties arises for the
priest. 185 Resolution of that conflict may be dependent upon the circumstances of the case. If the priest wishes to report suspected child abuse after
contact with the child, he may make a report and not violate the confidence
of the communication, since the suspicion of abuse could have arisen from
his observation of the child. A report under these circumstances would not
violate the priest-penitent privilege, but would advance the purpose of the
child abuse reporting statute and would ease the priest's anxieties about
aiding and protecting a child he believes to be in danger.
In order for the authorities to effectively protect the child, the reporting statutes require several pieces of information in the report of child
abuse. The information required in a report generally includes: the child's
name, the parent's name, the alleged abuser's name, and, if the report was
required, the name of the reporter. 86 The priest may be able to simply
make an anonymous report, giving the name of the child he feels is in danger. Under an anonymous report, the priest could alert the authorities of a
need to protect an endangered child without having to give the name of the
abuser. This type of action would only involve the priest in the identification
section of the child abuse reporting statute and would not violate the statutory priest-penitent privilege. However, such a report may still violate the
confidence made to the priest by the abuser. In the final analysis, the priest
must decide whether to report, after balancing the competing duties and
interests. Allowing the priest in this instance to balance the interests may
be the least violative of the priest-penitent relationship as communications
could be kept confidential. The purposes of the reporting statutes would also
be fulfilled as reports would be made when the priest observes endangered
children.
B.

Common-Law Analysis

Alternatively, an analysis of the common law could resolve the priest's
dilemma. In order to accomplish this analysis, the priest-penitent relationship will be compared to the relationships of other professionals. Then an
examination of how the courts have resolved the dilemma in cases involving
other professionals will be made. Finally, a resolution to the priest's di185.
but if the
similar to
186.

See Comment, supra note 8, at 647. If the priest reports, he violates a confidence,
priest does not report, he fails to protect a child he believes is in danger. This is
the conflict faced by the psychotherapist.
See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (1986).
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lemma will be made based on the similarities to other privileges and the
courts' decisions regarding those privileges.
To make this comparative analysis, the priest-penitent privilege must
be compared to other privileges. The privileges that will be compared to the
priest-penitent include: the physician-patient privilege, the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the husband-wife privilege, and the attorney-client privilege. All of these privileges promote and protect these relationships through
confidentiality rather than requiring compelled testimonial disclosure. 8 7 At
this level of comparison the privileges are all equivalent, and they are all
recognized as fulfilling the requirements of Wigmore's four-pronged test.' 88
However, a comparison of the interests and justifications for each privilege
indicates that although the privileges are similar in some respects, they may
not stand on equal footing in regard to the justifications of each privilege.
One interest that is common among the privileges mentioned is the
constitutional right to privacy.' 89 For the physician-patient privilege, the individual's privacy interest is found in the non-disclosure of medical records
and communications. 9 The psychotherapist-patient privilege involves similar privacy interests in not having evidence of treatment or communications
disclosed.' 9' The husband-wife privilege involves privacy interests in not
having family affairs disclosed to the public.19 The attorney-client privilege
contains the client's privacy interests in not having his discussions with the
attorney disclosed in court or elsewhere. 93 Finally, the priest-penitent privilege also involves the privacy4 interests of the penitent in not having his
9
confessions of sin disclosed.'

The privacy interest found in the priest-penitent relationship is closely
related to the privacy interest found in the psychotherapist-patient relationship. In the psychotherapist-patient relationship, the patient reveals his innermost secrets to the therapist. The only reason the patient is able to do
187. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
188. Under Wigmore's test, four fundamental conditions are recognized as necessary to
the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties. (3) The relationship must be one which in
the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would
inure to the relationship by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit gained thereby for the correct disposal of litigation.
See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 2285.
189. See C. McCORMICK, supra note I, at § 72.
190. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D. Nev. 1983).
191. See Comment, supra note 8, at 646.
192. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1310.
193. Id. at 1306-07.
194. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 2395.
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this is because the psychotherapist promises confidentiality.' 9 5 If the patient
is not assured that everything he says will be kept confidential, he will not
disclose his innermost secrets, and thus, treatment is hindered. Hence, the
relationship and effective therapy depend upon the protection of the individual's interests in privacy through confidentiality. 96
Similarly, the priest-penitent relationship involves the same type of privacy interests as the psychotherapist-patient relationship. The penitent, like
the patient, reveals his innermost secrets to the priest. The penitent discloses his secrets or sins, with the expected guarantee that the priest will
keep them confidential. If confidence were not promised, the penitent would
be less likely to disclose his sins, and the purpose of the relationship would
be diminished. 19 7 However, if a parishioner believes confession to be necessary to save his soul, almost nothing would keep him from confessing. Thus,
the psychotherapist-patient relationship is similar to the priest-penitent relationship in that each depends upon the protection of the individual's privacy interests through confidentiality.
The courts have decided several cases involving the conflict between
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and child abuse reporting statute. 19 8 In
all of these cases, the courts have held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived under the child abuse reporting statutes. In People v.
Younghanz, the court determined that the interests involved in the reporting statute overrode the interests in the privilege statutes. 199 In Younghanz,
the court decided that "the right of privacy was not absolute, and in some
circumstances subordinate to the states' fundamental right to enact laws
that promote public health, welfare, and safety, even though such laws
might invade the offender's right of privacy. '"200 Furthermore, the disclosure
requirement of the Child Abuse Reporting Act fell within the category of
20
permissable intrusions upon the right to privacy. As stated in Younghanz,
20 2
the right to privacy does not insulate a person from all judicial inquiry.
The court further stated that the state's interest in protecting children justi195. See Comment, supra note 8, at 646.
196. Id.
197. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 109.
198. See, e.g., In re Brenda H., 402 A.2d 169 (N.H. 1979); People v. Battaglia, 156
Cal. App. 3d 1016, 203 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1984) (both cases held that the privilege was abrogated by reporting statutes).
199. People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1984) (the court
held that a statute requiring reports of all known and suspected instances of child abuse was
not unconstitutional despite father's claim that it interfered with his right to seek cure for his
illness or that it compelled him to testify against himself).
200. Id. at 816, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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fies the intrusion imposed by the reporting statute.'" 3 Clearly for the psychotherapist-patient relationship, which is normally mentioned and abrogated in the child-abuse reporting statutes, no privilege exists when the
communication involves child abuse.
Although the priest-penitent privilege involves the same interest in privacy as the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the priest-penitent privilege
should not be abrogated like the psychotherapist-patient privilege because
the priest-penitent privilege also involves an additional interest in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. ' 04 The confidentiality of a con2 5
fession to a priest is arguably a religious belief held by many churches. 0 If
the confession is not kept confidential, many people would not confess. For
the Catholic Church this would be a serious infringement upon the free
exercise of religion, as confession of its members is a sacrament of the religion. This would also be an infringement on the free exercise of other religions that use confession as a means of spiritual counselling and guidance. 2°" Therefore, the priest-penitent relationship involves more than the
constitutional right of privacy and should be distinguished from the psychotherapist-patient privilege when applying the child abuse reporting statute.
In addition to the right to privacy, the attorney-client relationship similarly involves a constitutional interest in the client's constitutional due process rights.207 The attorney-client relationship depends upon the full and
truthful disclosure by the client to the attorney. The client, however, will
not be completely open to the attorney if he is not promised absolute confidentiality. Hence, in order to insure a fair trial and to insure that the client
is fully represented in a manner that meets due process requirements, the
attorney-client relationship is granted confidentiality.20 8
In cases involving child abuse, courts interpret the statutes to have
clearly retained the confidential status of the attorney-client privilege.2 0 9 As
mentioned, this is in part based upon the need for fair and adequate repre203. Id.
204. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 112. See also Developments in the Law - Privileged
Communication, supra note 40, at 1560.
205. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also Yellin, supra note 5, at 112.
Although there is an opposing argument that the privilege involves an establishment of religion, the religion clauses of the first amendment are designed to protect religious freedom.
Thus, compelling a minister to testify against his beliefs is contrary to the interests of a free
society and religious freedom.
206. See Yellin, supra note 5, at 128-33. As Yellin points out, the Catholic Church, the
Lutheran Church, and the Episcopal Church all require or use confession in their religious
practice. Id.
207. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07 (D.Nev. 1983).
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., In re Brenda H., 402 A.2d 169 (N.H. 1979) (stating the reporting statute
did abrogate all privileges except the attorney-client privilege).
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sentation of the individual. Because the relationship has this added dimension, over and above the privacy interest involved in the other privileged
relationships, legislatures and courts have carefully guarded the confidentiality found in the attorney-client privilege.21
The priest-penitent privilege is similar to the attorney-client privilege
in that it has an added dimension beyond the interests in privacy. Like the
added dimension of the attorney-client privilege, the constitutional interest
or right to free exercise of religion makes the priest-penitent privilege
unique. Arguably, the priest-penitent privilege should be treated similar to
the way the attorney-client privilege is treated in cases of child abuse. Since
the priest-penitent privilege, like the attorney-client privilege, is based on an
additional constitutional interest, greater weight should be given to the protection of the privilege than is given for other privileges. Thus, the priestpenitent privilege should be protected and retained in cases involving child
abuse, and therefore, confidences would remain privileged.
The priest-penitent privilege involves rights in free exercise of religion,
as many churches in practice and belief keep confessions confidential.
When the constitutional right to free exercise of religion is involved, only a
compelling state interest will override the interest being protected. 1' Thus,
the confidentiality granted under the priest-penitent privilege statutes
should be protected and retained, absent a compelling state interest.
Arguably, identifying and protecting abused children is a compelling
state interest. 2 " Thus, if the state could show that the interest in protecting
children from abuse outweighs the interests of confidentiality in the free
exercise of religion, the priest may be required to report and possibly to
testify. However, whether the priest should be required to report or testify
depends upon whether the state can show it is the least restrictive means
available of achieving the state's interest.
Requiring the priest to report suspected cases of child abuse, regardless
210. Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.010 (1986). Nevada requires reports from every attorney who suspects a child has been abused, and also abrogates all privileges in regard to
cases of child abuse.
211. The free exercise of religion is impaired, not only by governmental prohibition of
that which one's religious beliefs demand, but also by governmental compulsion of that which
one's religious beliefs forbid. Thus, if the priest's religious beliefs forbid him to disclose a
confidential communication, he should not be compelled to testify, absent a compelling state
interest that can be achieved by no less drastic means. See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). Cf. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 77, 152 S.E.2d 317, 326 (1967) (holding need for
testimony overrides any free exercise arguments).
212. See People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907, 910
(1984).
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of the manner in which the priest obtained the suspicion, is not the least
restrictive means available for identifying abused children. The state could
also identify suspected child abuse by limiting the priest's reports to observable suspicions..2 1 Although this may hinder the state's efforts in identifying abused children in cases where the priest obtains suspicions of abuse
from the child abuser, it would still advance the state's general interest in
identifying observed abused children. In addition, the right to free exercise
of religion involved in keeping communications confidential between priest
and penitent would also be advanced. For purposes of reporting, the least
restrictive means would be to limit reports to those instances in which the
priest observes a child he suspects to have been abused.
For purposes of testifying, the least restrictive means of achieving the
state's interest would be to require the priest to testify when the state cannot obtain the information from other sources.21 4 If the testimony is reasonably obtainable from other sources, then the interest in free exercise of religion should outweigh the state's interest. 21 Thus, in suspected cases of
child abuse the priest should be required to testify as to confidential communications only when he is the person who reported the abuse. In all other
cases of suspected child abuse the information of the suspicion could be
readily obtainable from the individual who made the report. A contrary
interpretation would lead to intolerable results.
Courts should not allow the states' interests in investigating child abuse
to violate the confidential communication and infringe upon the free exercise of religion when the evidence is obtainable from other sources. A contrary result would leave the states an unwarranted ability to open the doors
to confidential communications between the priest and penitent in every
case of suspected child abuse. An intrusion of this magnitude should not be
tolerated in light of the interests in free exercise of religion.2" 6 However,
when the priest has reported the suspected child abuse, states should be
allowed to invade the confidentiality of the communication upon a showing
of compelling need, as evidence, arguably, would not be readily obtainable
213. See, e.g., II PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2204 (Purdon 1982) which states, "Any
persons who ... come into contact with children shall report." See also Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-23-9 (1981) which states "Any [person] ... having reasonable cause to suspect a child
... whom he has knowledge through observation is . . . an abused child • . . shall ...
report."
214. See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985) (the court held the parents had no
right under free exercise clause of first amendment to refuse to testify against their son).
215. Id. at 433.
216. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Supreme Court held that the
Amish right to free exercise of religion outweighed the state's interest in compulsory education
past the eighth grade. The courts must be sensitive to the rights of citizens to freely exercise
their religious beliefs. Thus, the courts must carefully scrutinize the states' interest in requiring testimony from a priest who is bound to confidence in the free exercise of his religion. Id.
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from other sources.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Confidentiality is a necessary element for the proper functioning of the
priest-penitent relationship. This element of confidentiality, however, has
been challenged by child abuse reporting statutes, which require reporting
and testifying in cases of suspected child abuse. Since the reporting statutes
have not explicitly excluded priests from the group of those who are expected to report, the priest faces a dilemma when the communication made
to him deals with child abuse.
The resolution to the priest's dilemma may be achieved through both
statutory and common-law analysis of the conflicting duties and interests.
Under the statutory analysis, the dilemma the priest faces is resolved by
harmonizing the purposes of the apparently conflicting statutes, or by giving
deference to the latest or more specific statute. The purposes are harmonized by interpreting the reporting of suspected child abuse clauses and
abrogation of privileged communications clauses of the reporting statutes as
dealing with suspicions of abuse that arise from only the priest's observations. If this limitation of the reporting statute is used when the priest is
involved, then the confidentiality of the priest-penitent privilege is preserved, and the purposes of the child abuse statute are achieved with a minimal detriment. However, states could best protect the priest-penitent relationship and resolve the priest's dilemma by making the priest a permissive
reporter and by not abrogating the privilege. One state chose this means to
resolve the problem by amending the child abuse reporting statute to specifically exclude priests from mandatory reporting and testifying.
The dilemma, however, can be resolved by comparing the priest-penitent relationship to other relationships that are given confidentiality privileges. Upon initial comparison, the priest-penitent privilege appears similar
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If the analysis stops here, the
priest-penitent privilege would not be retained in cases of child abuse. However, the priest-penitent privilege is also similar to the attorney-client privilege because it is justified and grounded upon additional constitutional considerations. Hence, the priest-penitent privilege is a hybrid privilege due to
its foundation in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Because
the privilege is based in part on free exercise of religion, added weight
should be given when the privilege is balanced against the child abuse reporting statutes. Therefore, under the comparative common-law analysis,
unless the state shows there is no less drastic means to achieve a compelling
state interest, the priest-penitent privilege should be retained and the purposes of the privilege forwarded.
WILLIAM
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